A BANK CUSTOMER HAS NO REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY OF BANK RECORDS:
UNITED STATES v. MILLER

INTRODUCTION

Recent federal legislation accords privacy protection to individuals concerning information held and compiled by third parties.1
States have also recognized the need to protect a person's privacy
interest in information no longer in his exclusive control or possession.2 This legislation, however, is aimed only at limited kinds
of privacy problems. It does not represent a comprehensive
solution to the modern privacy dilemma: Does an individual 3have
a legitimate privacy claim to information held by third parties?
Customer records held by third party banks serve as a prototype
of the new privacy dilemma. A citizen finds it convenient, perhaps
necessary, to conduct his business through customary banking channels. His bank is required by law to maintain complete records
of most of these transactions. 4 The bank customer is probably convinced that his accounts with the bank are a matter of strict
privacy. 5 Nonetheless, in the recent case of United States v.
Miller,g the Supreme Court of the United States concluded that
subpoena of these records from the bank constituted no invasion
of a bank customer's constitutional right of privacy although cus1. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. 1975); Fair Credit
Reporting Act § 602, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1970); The Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)-(e) (Supp. 1975). Cf.
Freedom of Information Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (Supp. 1975) (balancing the interest in disclosure against the privacy interest).
2. For an extensive compilation of state laws regarding restriction of
government information practices, see Project, Government Information and
the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REv. 971, 1269-77 (1975).
3. See generally A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA
BANKS AND DossIERs 25 (1971).

4. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (Supp. 1976).
5. Mortimer, The IRS Summons and the Duty of Confidentiality: A
Hobson's Choice for Bankers--Revisited, 92 BANKING L.J. 832, 834-35. See
also United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp. 1004 (1969).
6. 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
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tomer record keeping is mandated by 8law7 and the records are suppoened without notice to the customer.
In Miller, the defendant was convicted of conspiring to defraud
the United States of tax revenues otherwise assessable upon
illegally distilled whiskey. Subpoenas issued by the United States
Attorney's office required the defendant's bank to produce all
records of accounts held in the name of the defendant Miller. The
bank complied without notifying Miller. The records provided
investigatory leads in Miller's case. In addition, copies of checks
were introduced at defendant's trial to establish the purchase of
materials allegedly used to further his illegal conduct. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's refusal to
suppress the evidence thus acquired, holding that the subpoena did
not satisfy legal process because it was not directed to the customer
as the true party in interest.9
Miller is worthy of close examination because it represents that
class of cases in which common expectations of privacy and actual
legal protections are not concordant. The reasoning of the Miller
case and others like it must be scrutinized in order to determine
the future development of constitutional privacy rights concerning
information held by third parties with no real interest in nondisclosure.
A critical advantage in analyzing the Miller decision is derived
from tracing the development of privacy rights. Such a back7. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (Supp. 1976).

The

Act was held constitutional on its face in California Bankers Ass'n v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), despite the argument that the compulsory record
keeping requirements of the Act constituted an unwarranted fourth amendment seizure.

8. The question of whether both compelled record keeping and subse-

quent order for production of those records constituted an unlawful fourth
amendment search and seizure was expressly reserved in California Bank-

ers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 53-54 n.24 (1974).

9. United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 758 (5th Cir. 1974). The court's
decision acknowledged the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act as determined by California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). How-

ever, the court of appeals held that the government had violated Miller's

fourth amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure by
"first requiring a third party bank to copy all of its depositor's personal

checks and then, with an improper invocation of legal process, calling upon
the bank to allow inspection and reproduction of those copies." 500 F.2d
at 757. The court found the subpoenas violative of legal process because
not issued to the party "whose rights are threatened by the improper disclosure"-i.e., the bank depositor. Id. at 758.

ground may be used as a reference to determine whether Miller
represents an enduring and positive contribution to the law of
privacy.
THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVACY INTEREST

The Right of Privacy in Tort

In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis advocated broad
legal recognition of the need for privacy.' 0 Examining a wide
spectrum of case authority, the writers conceded that the law concerning apparent privacy interests was in fact dominated by considerations of the plaintiff's property interest in the area of intrusion."
However, they also asserted that the true underlying
value served by the decisions was a belief in the individual's fundamental "right to be left alone."' 2 The authors outlined an evolution of legal protections which originated with rights in corporeal
property, expanded to include incorporeal property interests, and
finally extended to defend the spiritual interests of the human personality.' 3 Warren and Brandeis pleaded for a new right of
privacy in order to permit this evolution to keep pace with the
threats of intrusion posed by an age of new industry and inven14
tion.
The power of the Warren-Brandeis article is its attempt to place
the privacy interest upon a new conceptual framework. In making
this attempt, the authors sought to sever their new right of privacy
from the strict confinement imposed by traditional property
analysis. 15 However, the weakness of the Warren-Brandeis article
is its failure to construct a complete privacy model. Brilliantly
defining the purposes of the new privacy model, the authors
neglected to suggest an analytical method sufficient to accomplish
their goals. 16 As an apparent consequence of this failure to offer
10. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAv. L. Rsv. 193 (1890).
11. Id. at 203-04, 209, 211.
12. Id. at 204-05.
13. Id. at 193-94.
14. Id. at 195.
15. Id. at 205.
16. This indictment may be unfair in view of the enormity of the intellectual undertaking which would be required. See generally Bloustein, First

Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher,
28 RuTGERs L. REv. 41 (1974). The perimeters of the privacy right are assuming sharper delineation through a decisional process which examines
each case on its merits. See Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a
Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1974). This method of development may
be superior to efforts to fashion broad theoretical schemes without the benefit of case experience.
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a workable alternative, subsequent privacy cases retained close con17
ceptual affinity to traditional property law.
Dean Prosser represents a second major influence on the law of
privacy in tort. Prosser classified the privacy cases into four categories of law.' These categories have close relatives in the law of
defamation and property. For example, two privacy causes of action related to defamation are "public disclosure of private facts"' 9
and "false light in the public eye. ' 20 As a prima facie element
of his privacy case, the plaintiff must show a publication which
a person of ordinary sensibilities would consider offensive. 2 ' The
two other categories of privacy law in tort have their correlatives in property law. These causes of action are characterized
as "the right to be left alone" 22 and "wrongful appropriation
of another's name or likeness for personal gain. ' 23 The right to
17. See Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280 (1894); Schuyler v. Curtis,
147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (Gray, J., dissenting) (1895).
18. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW or TORTS 804 (4th ed. 1971).
19. However, a cause of action for tortious disclosure of private facts is
unlike a defamation action in several ways. The gist of the privacy action
is not damage to reputation but injury to feelings. See, e.g., Reed v. Real
Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945). Likewise, truth
is not a defense in a privacy action, and in such an action proof of special
damages is not necessary. See generally Wade, Defamation and the Right
of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962).
20. A cause of action for "false light in the public eye" likewise can be
differentiated from a defamation action in its emphasis on harm to feelings
rather than harm to character. However, as with defamation, falsity of the
publication is crucial. "The false light need not necessarily be a defamatory
one, although it very often is, so that a defamation action will also lie."
PROSSER, supra note 18, at 813.
21. In considering what a person of ordinary sensibilities would deem offensive, Prosser does little more than glibly refer to the probable influence
of social mores. Id. at 809, 813. Prosser has come under attack for his unanalytical treatment in this regard. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 9 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).
22. An intrusion upon a person's right to be left alone consists of an encroachment upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion. The cause
of action applies-e.g., to unauthorized prying into a person's bank account.
E.g., Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936). See generally Nader
v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647
(1970).
23. A cause of action for wrongful appropriation of another's name or
likeness for personal gain does not require violation of a person's seclusion
or secret life. Although the wrongful appropriation often involves publicity, this factor is not required. Neither does truth or falsity of the representation figure in the case. The essence of the action is material profit
without compensation. See PROSSER, supra note 18, at 805, noting that the
bulk of privacy actions has been in this area.

be left alone frequently corresponds to a trespass upon a plaintiff's
area of possession or ownership. 24 The appropriation of another's
name or likeness for personal gain closely resembles a wrongful
taking of another's property for personal profit. As a result, this
latter form of privacy has been the easiest for the courts to
25
accept.
The absence of a homogeneous rationale among the four categories of tort privacy is illustrated by Prosser's conclusion that these
four forms of privacy have almost nothing in common. 20 The case
law supports Prosser's conclusion despite frequent assertion that
the essence of the privacy right is the protection of human personality.2 7 If the right of privacy is founded on a common ideology,
why has the tort law taken these four disparate forms? Ironically,
the fault may lie with the liberal advocates of a broad privacy right.
These writers 28 have emphasized a need of the new privacy to
further values of "human dignity, ' 20 the sanctity of human feeling,30 or "the inviolability of the human personality."3 1 The difficulty these phrases pose as standards of judicial analysis is that
they do not differentiate the values to be served by a law of privacy
from the values which law serves generally. Therefore, it is understandable that the courts have relied so heavily on the defamation
and property law analogues to provide concrete decisional guide32
lines.
The ConstitutionalRight of Privacy
The right of privacy is not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, yet it is said to have its origins in the first, third, fourth, fifth,
24. For an example of how the common law was adapted to vindicate
privacy interests directly through property rights, see Harrison v. Rutland,
[1893] 1 Q.B. 142.

25. Brant, A General Introductionto Privacy, 61 MAss. L.Q. 10 (1976).
26. PROSSER, supra note 18, at 804.
27. See generally Thermo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306
Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753 (1940); Hull v. Curtiss Publishing Co., 182 Pa. 86,
125 A.2d 644 (1956).
28. E.g., Gross, The Concept of Privacy,. 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34 (1967);
Lackland, Toward Creating a Philosophy of Fundamental Human Rights,
6 COLTmJ. HumAx RIGHTs L. REv. 447, 473 (1975); Pratt, The Warren and
Brandeis Argument for a Right to Privacy, 1975 PuB. L. 161 (1975).
29. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964).
30. Forkosch, Privacy, Human Dignity, Euthanasia-Are They Independent ConstitutionalRights?, 3 U. SAN F ERu. V. L. REv., No. 2 1974, at 1.
31. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 208
(1890).
32. See note 16 supra.
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and ninth amendments to the Constitution. 3 If the right of privacy
did not exist, specific constitutional guarantees would represent
inexplicable exceptions to a general right of government intrusion.
Such a perverse constitutional interpretation was anticipated at the
time the Bill of Rights was drafted, and it was expressly rejected.3 4
In Griswold v. Connecticut,"5 Justice Douglas adopted language
intended to capture the essence of the constitutional right of
privacy: "The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance."3 6 As
an illustration, Justice Douglas examined the right of associationa right characterized as greater than mere physical assembly. Expressly guaranteed in the first amendment, the right of free speech
entails the greater freedom to express opinions through a right of
association, which itself is entailed in the even more abstract right
of privacy.3 7 To summarize, the penumbral theory of privacy is
the concept that privacy incorporates inexplicit protections intimately and inseparably merged with the specific liberties found in
the Bill of Rights. These broader related liberties form a "zone
of privacy ' 3 8 surrounding particular guarantees. The zones themselves blend to form a superstructure of privacy values accorded
constitutional protection. Without these general, implicit liberties,
specific freedoms would not have meaning.3 9
Although the penumbral theory suggests an expansive law of
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally Clark,
Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 VILL. L. REV.
833 (1974).
34. See 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CoNsTrruTIoN 436 (1836); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439
(Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).

35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. Id. at 484.
37. Id. at 482-83.
38. Id. at 484.
39. Id. Just what is the source of this meaning is a subject of perennial
debate. Compare Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934), with W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (concerning
freedom of contract in the New Deal era). Likewise, compare, Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), with Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483 (1955) ( marking the end of substantive due process protection of economic interests). The doctrinal relevance of these cases is apparent in present judicial attitudes toward expansion of the privacy right. See Rehnquist,

Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law
Enforcement? Or, Privacy, You've Come a Long Way Baby, 23 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1 (1974).

privacy, cases at the outer reaches of privacy protection 40 reveal
that the privacy right is confined not only to specific amendments,
but also to several limited fact patterns. 41 The judicial limitations imposed on the constitutional right of privacy are the result
of several considerations. First, constitutional privacy law has concerned itself only with government intrusions, leaving the development of a general privacy law to the various states. 42 Second,
some degree of limitation inheres in judicial malcontent with substantive due process-that is, generally, the substitution of personal
judicial values in lieu of primary reliance on established legal principles and precedent. 43 Third, some limitation results from the
Supreme Court's strategic anticipation of a time when the political
and moral views of the country can be better confirmed. 44 This
factor is especially relevant in view of the markedly changing role
of government in solving national problems and the continuing
development of sophisticated techniques of accumulating and processing massive amounts of information in order to carry out modern
45
governmental functions.
Even if an individual can demonstrate that his case does not fall
outside an area of limited protection, he. must nevertheless demon40. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). By
"outer reaches" is meant judicial identification of liberties not specifically
mentioned in the constitution nor previously recognized by judicial interpretation-e.g., the right to pursue a livelihood in Meyer v. Nebraska, supra,
41. E.g., activities or interests relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, child rearing, and education and family interests. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). See also id. at 209 (Douglas, J., concurring).
42. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967): "But the protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other
people-is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left
largely to the law of the individual States."
43. See note 39 supra. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972),
according privacy protection to the decision to procreate as a fundamental
interest.
44. See generally Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839 (1969). Note generally the Court's preoccupation with fitting legal rights in proper relation
with past and present social values in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 23
(1972). One Justice appeared to advance the role of law as a shaper of
future morality. Id. at 329-30, 360-62 (Marshall, J., concurring). "In other
words, the question with which we must deal is not whether a substantial
proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital
punishment is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so
in light of all information presently available." Id. at 362.
45. See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCEs, DATABANKS iN A FREE
SociETY (1972); V. Packard, THE NAKED SocIrETY (1964); Corbett, Computers
and the Protectionof Privacy, 126 NEw L.J. 556 (1976).
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strate that his expectation of privacy is reasonable.46

What is

reasonable will depend on the traditional expectations of privacy
surrounding the particular activity,47 the privacy commonly ac-

corded the location where the act occurs, 48 and the generally
accepted privacy of the allegedly private object itself, as, for

example, the human body. 49 Even if several or all of these factors favor a finding of privacy, the government interest will

possibly outweigh consideration of the privacy claim. 50
The reasonableness of the individual's privacy expectation is
closely dependent on his property interest in the place or thing
which is the focus of his privacy claim.5 ' Consequently, case
analysis is often dominated by property law in place of an independent inquiry into the underlying social norms and legal policies
52
which support or deny a subjective privacy expectation.

OlM-

stead v. United States53 is an extreme example of how property
rights were once determinative of the reasonableness of a privacy
claim. In Olmstead, the issue was whether government interception of the defendants' telephone calls was a violation of their
46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Reasonable is a term of art designating that class of privacy interests
which are recognized as legally protectible. See United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 751 (1971): "Our problem is not what the privacy expectations of
a particular defendant in particular situations may be or the extent to which
they may in fact have relied on the discretion of their companions."
47. See note 41 supra.
48. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Lewis
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
49. Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891): "No right
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person." This concept of self as its own object of possession is unique and
initially startling. A new formulation of the privacy right, wishing to retain the analytical foundations of property law, could model itself around
this basic philosophical premise.
50. The interest in effective tax collection was implied to be one such
consideration in United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. at 1624. Cf. Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973), denying petitioner claim to object
to an IRS summons: "[R]espect of [constitutional] principles is eroded
when they leap their proper bounds to interfere with the legitimate interest
of society in enforcement of its laws and collection of the revenues."
51. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483
(1964).
52. E.g., Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969).
53. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

fourth amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
The surveillance was accomplished by cutting into a telephone line
located off defendants' property. The Supreme Court held no
fourth amendment violation occurred because of the absence of a
technical trespass.
Warden v. Hayden54 overturned Olmstead on this point. In
Warden the Supreme Court declared: "The premise that property
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize
has been discredited."55 In Warden, evidence was admitted which
had been seized without a warrant by police who had entered onto
private premises in "hot pursuit" of an armed robber. The exigencies of the circumstances militated against a mechanical application
of the trespass doctrine used in Olmstead.
A more convincing denigration of Olmstead's trespass requirement is found in Katz v. United States.5" In Katz, the police
placed a "bug" outside a public phone booth. The lower courts
admitted into evidence conversations thereby intercepted without
a warrant. 57 The Supreme Court reversed,5" stating that the
absence of a technical government trespass was not determinative,
"for the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."5 9
This statement does not mean that the Court extended legal
protections to all subjective expectations of privacy. Subsequent
cases indicate that legal protections remain severely curtailed by
limitations inherent in the reasonableness standard. 60 These limitations still often turn on findings of who61 possesses the allegedly
private information or where62 the allegedly private act occurred.
The analytical transition which occurred between Olmstead and
Katz may therefore represent little more than abolition of technical
trespass as per se determinative of privacy protections. 3 In
summary, in cases not involving the several fundamental privacy
interests, 4 customary property analysis apparently controls the
54. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
55. Id. at 304.
56. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
57. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966).
58. 389 U.S. at 359.
59. Id. at 351.
60. See generally Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth
Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 133, 136-39.
61. E.g., Mancussi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368-70 (1968).
62. See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142-45 (1962).
63. See note 60 supra. See also Comment, The Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy-Katz v. United States, A Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. REV. 468, 480
(1976).
64. See notes 40 & 41 supra.
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inquiry into alleged rights of privacy. The determination of the
privacy right is thereupon made with little or no consideration of

the underlying personal interests which are in peril.6 5
United States v. Miller 66 represents one class of privacy cases
in which the property analysis remains especially embedded in judicial thinking.

7

The issue in these cases is whether a person has

a constitutional right of privacy in records possessed by an independent third party. After Miller, the law is clearly that he
does not. That law turns entirely on the simple question of who
has possession of the allegedly private records. 68 A probe into the
future significance of the Miller decision must include a search of
the possible policies which justify the Court's simplistic resolution
of intricate privacy arguments.
ANALYSIS OF THE Miller DECISION

Despite the redundant statement of issues and reiteration of arguments in the Miller opinion, the Supreme Court's reasoning actually
proceeded in three basic steps. The first step may be characterized
as an examination of the nature of the allegedly private documents.
The second step identified the crucial factor of possession and its
determination of the entire privacy issue. The third step focused
upon the relationship between a bank and its customer in order
to test the possibility of an exception to the decisive element of
possession. These steps culminated in the Court's holding that the
defendant had no fourth amendment privacy rights in "private
papers"69 held by the bank because he had neither ownership nor
possession of the records7 0 and because the bank did not hold the
records as a "neutral agent"7 ' for the defendant.
Nature of the Documents
The Supreme Court noted that the microfilmed bank records
65. This is especially true in cases holding that the complainant does not
have a sufficient interest to afford him a right of objection to agency subpoenas issued to a witness holding allegedly private records. See Foster
v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1959) and cases cited therein.
66. 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
67. See generally Application of Carrol, 246 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1957);
United States v. Peoples Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 212 F.2d 86 (6th Cir.
1954).
68. See notes 66 & 67 supra.
69. 96 S. Ct. at 1622.
70. Id. at 1623.
71. Id.

were not the private papers traditionally protected by the fourth
amendment. The private papers concept is derived from the 1886
case of Boyd v. United States.72 In Boyd, the Court declared
unconstitutional a court order issued to defendants for production
of an invoice which was sought as evidence against them for certain customs violations. The Court held the order to be a clear
violation of "the right of the people to be secure in their. . . papers
• .. against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . . ,3 Boyd is
clearly and easily distinguishable from the facts in Miller. It would
be impractical to structure a right of privacy to bank records
within the factual limitations of the Boyd case. 74 As a result, the
Court's invocation of the circumstances in Boyd reached a foregone
conclusion which effectively skirted a confrontation with the
modern privacy problem actually present in Miller-whether to extend privacy protections to records not in the possession of the
party actually to be injured by disclosure.
Boyd represents one aspect of constitutionally recognized privacy
protection: A person has a reasonable expectation that personal
papers kept in his possession will not be forcibly seized and used
against him at trial. That rule is sound, but it should not be
exhaustive. Today, information which a person once would keep
in the privacy of his home or office necessarily finds its way into
the dossiers of numerous private and public institutions. 7 The
individual's file is but one of hundreds, thousands, or possibly
millions of such files which the institution retains for limited purposes. Compared to the interest of the individual, the institution
has minimal concern with the consequences of disclosure of any
particular file. In other words, the privacy interest has in fact
followed the information, while the law has followed the material
records as tangible objects of possession. It is this discordance
between fact and law which undermines the reasoning used in cases
such as United States v. Miller.
A second consideration in the Supreme Court's analysis of the
nature of the allegedly private documents in Miller concerned the
distinction between the privacy of negotiable instruments and
microfilmed records.76 In fact, the Court examined the defendant's case in view of any alleged privacy right in the individual
72. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
73. U..

CONST. amend. IV.

74. The possession shibboleth was not operative in Boyd because defendants themselves held the subpoenaed invoice.
75. A.

MILLER, THE AssAULT ON PRIVAcY:

DossiERs 24 (1971).

76. 96 S. Ct. at 1623.

COMPUTERS, DATABANKS,

AND
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instruments rather than in the microfilmed record of those instruments. The Court apparently assumed that the defendant had a
better case for privacy of the individual instruments than the
microfilmed records because he had possession of the separate
checks but not the microfilm. 77 This assumption had the effect
of locking the privacy right into a possession analysis. The Court's
emphasis on the form of the documents limited the issue to the
privacy of the tangible commercial items as physical objects of
possession. An analysis of the right of privacy to the information
contained on the physical paper or microfilm was thereupon fore78
closed.
Had the Suprerhie Court adopted an information rather than a
possession analysis, the logical focal point for decision would have
been the microfilmed bank records. The issue would then be the
character and result of unwarranted disclosure by government
seizure. This shift of attention would occur for at least two reasons.
Foremost, an analysis of the separate instruments would not accurately serve to reach a conclusion concerning the composite information revealed by seizure of the microfilm. The pictures revealed
are radically different. 79 Second, the bank customer does not
waive his privacy right by public exposure of the microfilm composite, although he may have done so in regard to the limited
information contained on a single negotiable instrument placed in
public commerce.8 0 Exposing the parts to sundry unrelated people
is not equivalent to exposing the whole to one's bank for limited
business purposes.81
77. The Court avoids any explanation of why a possession analysis is superior generally or why it aids the defendant's case in particular.
78. A series of implicit assumptions concerning the possession of the records as the appropriate analytical criterion has the obvious effect of making
the Court's conclusion appear inevitable.
79. "In the course of such dealings, a depositor reveals many aspects of
his personal affairs, opinions, habits, and associations. Indeed, the totality
of bank records provides a virtual current biography." Burrows v. Superior

Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 248, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172, 529 P.2d 590, 596 (1974).
80. The payee or endorsee of any one check is likely to be a stranger

to the drawer, who neither comprehends nor cares about this check's significance as part of a pattern of activity.
81. Although a bank employee may see a customer's checks in bundles,
the employee and customer are often unaware of the other's private life.
In addition, brief business exposure is probably insufficient to permit the
careful examination necessary to construct accurate conclusions about the
customer's lifestyle.

These considerations reveal the relative complexity of an informational rather than a possessory right of privacy. However, the
easy analysis ignores the fact that the true injury to the privacy
right results from an unwarranted disclosure of private information
rather than from the incidental fact that another person possesses
the material medium of the information for some limited purpose.
To permit unchecked government seizure of information held by
largely indifferent third parties because the information is not in
the form of the injured party's private papers represents a serious
deficiency in the present constitutional law of privacy.
The PossessionFactorand its Determinationof the Privacy Issue
The Miller opinion held that the defendant had no protectable
fourth amendment interest because "unlike the claimant in Boyd,
respondent can assert neither ownership nor possession. 8' 2 The
fact that the Bank Secrecy Act 8 3 compelled the defendant's bank
to keep the subpoenaed records was held immaterial to the government's right to seize the records without notice to a party not himself in possession of the records. These conclusions were reached
by focusing upon the defendant's release of his separate checks into
the possession of bank employees for processing.8 4 In effect, that
voluntary dispossession was held to constitute a waiver of any
8
privacy protections defendant might claim. 5
The possession factor thoroughly pervades the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Miller, as it does in similar cases.8 6 The possessionprivacy analogue undoubtedly has merit in human experience and
common understanding.8 7 However, decisions in this area typically lack discussion of the actual values and policies which support
physical possession as a satisfactory and sometimes sufficient
criterion of the privacy issue. Nonetheless, an assessment of the
lasting merit of the possession factor requires a penetration of the
considerations which may decide its continued use. The possible
policies which support the possession-ownership analogue may be
grouped into three broad categories: the property rights rationale,
the ease of analysis rationale, and the sense of justice rationale.
82. 96 S.Ct. at 1623.
83. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (d)(Supp. 1976).
84. 96 S. Ct. at 1624.
85. Possession is treated as a finding necessary to cement subjective interests and legal protections.
86. See generally Application of Levine, 149 F. Supp. 642 (1956); United
States v. United Distillers Products Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946).
87. That is, people do commonly correlate privacy expectations with their
possession of certain places and things.
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A property rights rationale may be one explanation of the
possession requirement. Privacy in this regard constitutes an
aspect of property enjoyment. Unreasonable government search
and seizure represents a wrongful interference with this right of
enjoyment. Indeed, the concept of private incorporates the idea
of an implicit barrier separating the individual's property from the
8
reach of the public domain.1
A concept of privacy founded in the concept of property enjoyment would make the privacy right correspondent to the constitutionally protected uses of the property. For example, a special
right of use of one's home has been held to include the right to
possess and enjoy obscene materials 9 and to smoke marijuana90
without fear of government invasion. These same activities may
be so socially undesirable that no similar right of property enjoyment attaches to public property.9 1
That the privacy interest is sometimes only a property right is
illustrated by the cases of Stanley v. Georgia9 2 and Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton.93 In Stanley, the Supreme Court held that
a person may not be convicted for the possession of obscene matter
kept for private use in his home. Stanley is instructive because
it illustrates how a limited right of property enjoyment can be misleadingly merged with spiritual and intellectual pleasures not
necessarily dependent on property rights. Concerning a Georgia
statute which made unlawful the possession of obscene material,
Justice Marshall wrote in sweeping language: "[The] right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is
fundamental to our free society. . . . Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds. '94 The force of this language diverts attention
from the fact that ultimately it may apply only as a right of private
property, at least concerning information offensive to public morality. In ParisAdult Theatre, the petitioner relied on Stanley to argue
that the state could not close a public pornographic theatre in At88.
89.
90.
91.

See Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
E.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973).

92. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).

93. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
94. 394 U.S. at 564-65.

lanta. It was argued that the state had no legitimate interest in
controlling the moral content of a person's thoughts.0 5 The Court
held that Georgia was constitutionally competent to determine
whether such films provided grist for human mind or spirit10 Distinguishing Stanley v. Georgia,the Court said:
If obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment in itself
carried with it a "penumbra" of constitutionally protected privacy, the Court would not have found it necessary to decide Stanley
on the narrow basis of the "privacy of the home," which was little
more than a reaffirmation that "a man's home is his castle"...
The idea of a "privacy" right and a place of public accommodation

are, in this context, mutually exclusive. 7
The property rights rationale, however, cannot exhaustively
explain those forms of privacy not so clearly aligned with a proprietary interest, as, for example, rights of privacy related to
family, marriage, procreation, and child rearing. Nevertheless, the
element of possession is frequently central even in cases of this
type.9 8 Therefore, other rationales justifying the possession factor
in privacy cases may be operative.
A second policy promoting the possession analogue in privacy
analysis is the ease of analysis rationale. The purpose behind this
rationale is to permit relatively simple evidentiary findings. 9
These findings are useful because there is a high positive correlation
between a person's exclusive physical possession of a place or thing
and his expectation that that place or thing is private. Conversely,
a finding of non-possession is identifiable with non-privacy. For
example, non-possession or non-ownership of documents revealing
information about one's self implies unqualified possession or ownership in another. Thereupon, a presumption arises that such information is not private, but rather public. Regarding the privacy
of documents held by third parties, that presumption appears to be
irrebuttable1 00
95. 413 U.S. at 67.

96. Id. at 69.
97. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 66 n.13: "Such protected privacy extends to the doctor's office, the hospital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the
right to intimacy involved." Possession in this context means locational
possession of a given physical space.
99. The physical constraints of clothing, automobile, bedroom, or house
are more easily identified than the conceptual perimeters of philosophical
discourse. To some extent, of course, the Justice must always play the role
of Philosopher. See generally Bloustein, First Amendment and Privacy:
The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERs L. REV. 41
(1974).
100. An exception will apply in the event that the third party holds the
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The fact that the presumption operates even though it ignores
personal expectations of privacy to records held by a third party
indicates other analytical aids are present. One such aid would be
that the possession-privacy presumption imposes a logical limitation
on the broad scope of possible privacy interests. 10 1 The privacy
10 2
right itself is not contained in any one protection alone.
Therefore, the possession-privacy presumption is a convenient
analytical aid in selecting the interests appropriate for constitutional protection. In addition, the possession-privacy presumption
imposes a means of judicial restraint in cases in which there are
otherwise no established principles for decision.
A third policy furthering the possession analogue in privacy
analysis is the sense of justice rationale. A sense that the privacy
law is just results from its predictability and its incorporation of
commonly accepted values. The property law analogue accomplishes both these purposes. Although few people have a clear idea
of what privacy means, many understand the basic legal significance of possession. Therefore, if privacy rights are correspondent
to property rights, a person can predict what constitutes an invasion of privacy because he can easily identify the analogous prop10 3
erty invasion.
Likewise, a privacy law modeled after property law will serve
many of the same values. For example, both fields of law further
a belief in individualism and exclusivity of right. On the one hand,
property law emphasizes a person's right to have his property left
alone. On the other hand, privacy law focuses on the right of the
person himself to be left alone.' 0 4 Similarly, a right to the
privacy of one's home, for example, reinforces the value of free
enjoyment of property. Conversely, the free enjoyment of property
reinforces the value in using the premises without fear of surveilrecords pursuant to a legal privilege. But see Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322 (1973).
101. By "logical" is not meant logical in all cases, but merely that the
possession restriction does in fact often correspond to physical areas of privacy expectation. Obviously, Miller represents a particular subset of privacy expectations falling outside the class of legally protectible interests.
102. See note 33 supra.
103. Of course, this principle is less definite in application when privacy
is treated as a fundamental interest. Nevertheless, it applies. See note 98
supra.
104. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (1928).

lance or observation. In conclusion, privacy law modeled after
property law inherits qualities of both predictability and compatibility with basic values. These factors assure that privacy law,
despite its unwieldy philosophical dimensions,0 5 will be harmonious with commonly accepted notions of justice.
Although some or all of these rationales may operate to justify
the survival of the property analogue, countervailing considerations
remain. For example, even if the property analogue is useful, is
it necessary? With the emergence of modern data collection systems maintained by largely anonymous third parties, 10 the property analogue may be suffering from a serious inability to adapt
to new privacy needs and common expectations. Further, the
analogue may represent a potential denial of due process in those
07
cases in which the irrebutable presumption of non-privacy'
shows no reasonable relation to commonly held values or to the
facts of common experience.
Relationship Between Bank and Customer
In addition to examining the nature of the documents, the third
step in the Supreme Court's opinion focused upon the relationship
between a bank and its customer in deciding if Miller had a protectable expectation of privacy to records held by the bank. The Court
expressly held that a bank is not a "neutral agent" in keeping
records of its customer's transactions. 10 8 Rather, the bank used
the records pursuant to its own business operations. Therefore,
only the bank had a legally protectible privacy interest to challenge
the subpoena because of the two independent parties of interest,
only the bank had possession. However, only Miller faced the prospect of real injury by disclosure. 10 9
An analysis of the Court's characterization of the bank-customer
relationship first requires an examination of the opinion's use of
the "neutral agent" concept. A neutral agency characterization
will seldom save a bank customer's privacy expectation to records
105. See note 28 supra.
106. See note 45 supra.
107. See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972).
An attack on the apparently irrebuttable presumption of non-privacy in
bank privacy cases faces formidable obstacles not generally present in related cases. The presumption in Miller is not legislative, but decisional,
and the presumption is one of law, not fact.
108. 96 S. Ct. at 1623.
109. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting), and id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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in the possession of a third party institution. Such business entities
almost always have some independent business purpose in keeping
files on customers or potential customers. In the majority of cases,
therefore, the apparent neutral agency exception to the possession
requirement offers only shallow promise of relief for the bank
customer.110
Given the disproportionate interests in non-disclosure between
bank and customer, the harshness of the Miller decision raises
several policy issues concerning the appropriate legal relationship
between a bank and its customer. One such relationship might be a
legal bank-customer privilege of confidentiality. The Miller Court
did not discuss the policies favoring the creation of a bank-customer
privilege, unless that consideration is vaguely subsumed in the
discussion of neutral agency."'
There is evidence that banking institutions and their customers
assume that a relation of confidentiality exists in their normal
interactions. 1 2 Whether such expectations should be accorded
legal protection in the future will depend on an evaluation of the
policies furthered by creating such a privilege. The new privilege
would have the clear advantage of avoiding the ritualistic decisionmaking which characterizes the possession analysis. The privilege
would recognize the fact that banks are inescapable intermediaries
in modern commercial transactions. Indeed, an individual's release
of information to his bank is unavoidable if he is to conduct
business in modern society. Therefore, the privilege would spare
the customer the unsavory dilemma of either not using the banking system or using it and waiving his protectible privacy interest.
Most importantly, the creation of a bank-customer privilege would
shift the privacy analysis to the party actually harmed by disclosure
-the customer. In contrast, a neutral agency analysis, on finding
an independent business interest in the bank, entirely ignores the
customer's privacy interest.
In contrast, there are convincing arguments against the creation
of a bank-customer privilege as a means to protect the customer's
110. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973), implying
that an accountant cannot be deemed a neutral agent.
111. There is no right of privileged communication between bank and
customer. See Stark v. Connelly, 347 F. Supp. 1242 (1972).

112. LeValley, The LR.S. Summons and the Duty of Confidentiality: A
Hobson's Choice for Bankers, 89 BANKING'L.J. 979 (1972).

privacy interest. First, the privilege would protect that interest
only indirectly. The real reason for the privilege would be to
further commercial banking interests and customer confidence." 3
Second, whatever aid the new privilege might offer to expansion
of the privacy right, it would be limited to banks only. If the
privilege were expanded to include other third party institutions,
each privilege would require a tailor-made rationale to justify its
extension to that particular relation. In short, the law of privacy
would develop as a series of privileged exceptions, none of which
promote the privacy interest directly."" Third, privileges are
generally an object of judicial disfavor because they have the
effect of excluding relevant, material evidence." 3
These considerations indicate that an affirmative reformulation
of the privacy right is necessary to adequately protect expectations
of privacy to information held by third party institutions. Until
that reformulation is accomplished, the rule in Miller goes unchallenged: A customer who reveals his commercial transactions to his
bank assumes the risk of injury resulting from the bank's release
of that information to a third party.""
"Existing Legal Process"
A final holding of the Miller Court was that the Bank Secrecy
Act" 7 does not accord the defendant greater due process rights
than he was otherwise entitled to before the Act's passage. Therefore, the Court's general conclusion that the defendant had no due
process rights whatever to object to his bank's disclosure of bank
records remained true even in view of the Supreme Court's decision in California Bankers Association v. Schultz,n s which stated
that the provisions of the Secrecy Act were to be enforced in conformity with "existing legal process."" 9 In effect, the Court
found that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy
as a matter of law and therefore as a matter of law was not entitled
to legal vindication of rights he did not possess. The Miller decision implies that it reached this conclusion in part because the
exigencies of the tax collection system require unimpeded govern113. As to the basis of privileges, see 8 J.WIGMORE, EvIDENCE (McNaughton rev.) §§ 2192, 2197, & 2285 (1973).
114. Every privilege is an aspect of privacy, but there is no privacy privilege.
115. C. McComvicIc, EVIDENCE 156-57 (2d ed. 1972).
116. 96 S. Ct. at 1624, and cases cited therein.
117. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (d)(Supp. 1976).
118. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
119. Id. at 52.
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ment power to investigate and prosecute evasions such as those in
120
Miller.
In view of the potential injury a bank customer may sustain by
disclosure of his bank records, 121 it is difficult to understand why
Miller was denied any legal protection whatever. He might have
been afforded at least minimal due process notice that the subpoena
had been served on his bank. He would then have had an opportunity to intervene to demonstrate his interest in non-disclosure. 122 In this regard, the harshness of a strict possession
analysis is apparent as one realizes that the actual extent of injury
or intrusion to the customer is immaterial to the finding of nonprivacy. Furthermore, if it is true, as the Miller decision implies,
that the opinion was in part reached with deference to efficient
tax collection, it remains doubtful that the government interest so
overwhelmingly outweighs the individual's privacy interest.
CONCLUSION
The Miller case stands for the proposition that a bank customer
has no reasonable expectation of privacy to bank records in the
possession of his bank. As a consequence, the bank customer is
entitled to no protections of due process, not even notice that a
subpoena has been served on his bank pursuant to an investigation
directed against him. That conclusion is unaffected by the fact
that the government on the one hand requires that the bank compile extensive records on its customer 123 and on the other hand subpoenas those records from the bank without affording the customer a right to object. 12 4 This Comment has briefly traced the
120. 96 S. Ct. 1624. Cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329, & 335
(1973), implying that tax exigencies represent a significant independent
factor in privacy analysis.
121. See note 109 supra.
122. See Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936). Cf. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 523 (1971), definitively basing the privacy
right upon a proprietary interest.
123. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (Supp. 1976). See
generally Flippen, Internal Revenue Service Summons: An Unreasonable
Expense and Burden on Banks and An Invasion of the Depositor'sPrivacy,
12 Am. Bus. L.J. 249 (1975).
124. This Comment has postulated tha, a taxpayer should have a protectible privacy interest in bank records in the possession of his bank. This
postulate is distinct from the related inquiry into whether every privacy injury shall have a remedy. For example, some forms of injury may be so
categorically minor as not to justify procedural impedance of the tax colle6-

development of the privacy right, examined the policies supporting
the possession rationale in determining that right, and evaluated
the Miller decision in view of its particular analysis of a privacy
claim to records in the possession of a third party bank. Because
Miller unreflectingly adheres to possession as a sweeping determinant of privacy rights, the opinion does not represent a formidable contribution to the raison d'etre of the possession factor in
privacy law. Ironically, the true merit of the Miller opinion is that
it may spur efforts to develop an adequate conceptual alternative
to present privacy analysis concerning privacy rights to records in
the possession of third parties.
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tion process. In contrast, a nattern of I.R.S. investigation which reveals that
bank record information is being used to silence undesirable political views
would not be de minimus. In any event, the question of whether the injury is one worthy of legal redress cannot arise until the comnlainant is
afforded the threshold right to present his claim before an impartial adjudicator. Only when the private right is recognized can procedures be designed
to accommodate the opposing governmental interests.

